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CVE-2022-0847: Arbitrary File Overwrite Vulnerability in Linux Kernel

 

Description

CVEDisclosureAttackerKBIVM ContentPatching UrgencyBlog’s Last Update
CVE-2022-0847Original disclosureAttackerKBMarch 10, 2022When practicalMarch 10, 2022 3:21 PM EST

CVE-2022-0847: Arbitrary File Overwrite Vulnerability in Linux Kernel

On March 7, 2022, CM4all security researcher Max Kellermann published technical details on CVE-2022-0847, an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in versions 5.8+ of the Linux kernel. Nicknamed “Dirty Pipe,” the vulnerability arises from incorrect Unix pipe handling, where unprivileged processes can corrupt read-only files. Successful exploitation allows local attackers to escalate privileges by modifying or overwriting typically inaccessible files — potentially including root passwords and SUID binaries.

CVE-2022-0847 affects Linux kernel versions since 5.8. Read Rapid7’s full technical analysis of the vulnerability in AttackerKB, including PoC and patch analysis.

While CVSS is not yet available, CVE-2022-0847 will likely carry a “High” severity rating rather than a “Critical” one given the authentication requirement. Multiple public exploits are available, including a proof of concept from the original disclosure and a Metasploit module. We are not aware of any reports of exploitation in the wild as of March 9, 2022.

This is a “patch, but no need to panic” situation. With that said, a few factors make this bug stand out a bit more than the average local privilege escalation (LPE) vuln. First and foremost, this is a simple attack to execute once initial access has been obtained, and it offers adversaries broad avenues for privileged operations after sensitive files (like root passwords) have been modified. Security researchers have also demonstrated that in some cases, public exploit code can be used to escape containers in that files modified inside the container also get modified on the host. Finally, the lingering specter of Log4Shell means that there may be a higher chance that attackers already have local access required to execute a privilege escalation attack on Linux systems.

Updates to Linux distributions have been trickling out. Organizations should apply the latest patches as soon as they are available and reboot systems.

Rapid7 customers

The March 10 content release for InsightVM and Nexpose includes checks for CVE-2022-0847 for Debian, Ubuntu, and SUSE. Coverage for Amazon Linux, Red Hat Linux, and CentOS Linux is available in the March 11 content update.

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InsightVM Scan Engine: Understanding MAC Address Discovery

 

Description

InsightVM Scan Engine: Understanding MAC Address Discovery

Written in collaboration with Jimmy Cancilla

When scanning an asset, one key piece of data that the InsightVM Scan Engine collects is the MAC address of the network interface used during the connection. The MAC address is one of several attributes used by the Security Console to perform asset correlation. As a result of the volatile nature of IP addresses, identifying assets using the MAC address can provide increased reliability when integrating scan results. In some cases, the MAC address can be used as a rudimentary means of fingerprinting an asset. Several manufacturers will use the same first 3 bytes when assigning a MAC address to a device (for example, several CISCO SYSTEMS, INC devices use 00000C as the MAC address prefix).

When performing an authenticated scan (a scan whereby the engine has the necessary credentials to authenticate to the target), collecting the MAC address is relatively straightforward, as all operating systems provide tooling to gather this information. However, collecting the MAC address with an unauthenticated scan (a scan where no credentials are provided) is less reliable. This is due to limitations of network protocols and modern network topologies.

Breaking down IP protocols

In order to understand these limitations, it is important to first understand the fundamentals of the IP protocol suite.

The IP protocol suite can be thought of in 4 layers:

InsightVM Scan Engine: Understanding MAC Address Discovery

The MAC address is part of the bottom layer called the Link Layer. The MAC address is used by the hardware when communicating with other devices on the same network equipment. Any devices communicating at the Link layer do so without the use of routers.

On the other hand, IP addresses are part of the Network layer. IP addresses are used to communicate with devices across different networks, traversing through routers.

MAC address discovery with unauthenticated scans

This leads to the limitation in unauthenticated scans. When performing an unauthenticated scan against assets that are accessed via a router, the scan engine is only able to communicate with that asset via the Network layer. The implications of this are that the MAC address is not included in the network packets received by the scan engine. This is not a limitation or defect of the scan engine, but rather a reality of the IP protocol suite and modern network infrastructure.

To work around these limitations in the IP protocol suite, the InsightVM scan engine uses several alternative methods to attempt to collect the MAC address of assets being scanned. In general, these alternative methods attempt to authenticate to an asset over various protocols using known default credentials. As a result of this capability in the scan engine, asset results from unauthenticated scans may include the MAC address despite being scanned over a router. However, it is important to note that the success rate is dependent on whether assets are configured to allow authentication using default credentials.

****Note:SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 are more likely than most protocols to be configured with known default credentials.

Summary

The following tables outline the different methods that the scan engine will use to collect MAC addresses from targets, and whether or not authentication is required.

Windows

MethodAuthenticated or unauthenticated scan
via SMB protocolAuthenticated
via WMI protocolAuthenticated
Scan AssistantAuthenticated
SNMPv1 or SNMPv2Authenticated or unauthenticated

Note: Collecting the MAC address via SNMPv1 or SNMPv2 with an unauthenticated scan is only possible if the scan engine can authenticate using the default credentials for these protocols. However, it is not recommended that default credentials be left enabled as this poses a serious security risk.

Linux

MethodAuthenticated or unauthenticated scan
Via SSH protocolAuthenticated
Via an insecure Telnet protocolAuthenticated

Note: Running an insecure Telnet server on an asset is a serious security risk and is not recommended.
SNMPv1 or SNMPv2 | Authenticated or unauthenticated

Note: Collecting the MAC address via SNMPv1 or SNMPv2 with an unauthenticated scan is only possible if the scan engine can authenticate using the default credentials for these protocols. However, it is not recommended that default credentials be left enabled as this poses a serious security risk.

Over the years, the engineering team here at Rapid7 has partnered with dozens of security teams to identify pain points and develop solutions. The importance of collecting the MAC address for targets being scanned is well understood. As a result, the InsightVM Scan Engine has been designed to utilize a multi-pronged approach to collecting MAC addresses from assets.

[Security Nation] Matthew Kienow on Open-Source Security and the Recog Framework

 

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[Security Nation] Matthew Kienow on Open-Source Security and the Recog Framework

In this episode of Security Nation, Jen and Tod chat with Matthew Kienow, Senior Software Engineer at Rapid7, about open-source security – a subject he knows a thing or two about from his work on Metasploit, AttackerKB, and most recently the Recog recognition framework. They discuss the selling points and drawbacks of open source, why seeing all the code doesn’t mean you can see all the bugs, and how open-source projects like Recog make the digital world a better place.

Stick around for our Rapid Rundown, where Matthew sticks around to chat with Tod and Jen about a worrying trend in DDoS attacks that allows for amplification levels of 65x.

Matthew Kienow

[Security Nation] Matthew Kienow on Open-Source Security and the Recog Framework

Matthew Kienow is a software engineer and security researcher. Matthew is currently responsible for the Recog recognition framework project at Rapid7 and previously worked on the AttackerKB project, as well as Metasploit’s MSF 5 APIs. He has also designed, built, and successfully deployed many secure software solutions; however, often he enjoys breaking them instead. He has presented his research at various security conferences including DerbyCon, Hack In Paris, and CarolinaCon. His research has been cited by CSO, Threatpost, and SC Magazine.

Show notes

Interview links

Rapid Rundown links

Like the show? Want to keep Jen and Tod in the podcasting business? Feel free to rate and review with your favorite podcast purveyor, like Apple Podcasts.

InsightAppSec GitHub Integration Keeps Risky Code From Reaching Production

 

Description

InsightAppSec GitHub Integration Keeps Risky Code From Reaching Production

We’ve all been there. The software development life cycle (SDLC) is moving at a mile a minute. Developers are writing code, updating features, and all the while attempting to keep everything introduced into production as safe and secure as possible. GitHub Actions are essential to automation and allow you to build, test, and deploy your code right from GitHub, faster than ever.

But it comes with risks.

How can you be sure your running applications aren’t vulnerable to exploitation? How will we know it’s problematic before it gets into production? Can we realistically perform kick-off, test, and provide feedback to development not using automation?

Secure apps through automation

A DevSecOps mindset is needed, with security baked into the SDLC — and now, GitHub Actions makes this easier than ever. This new integration — offered completely free to InsightAppSec customers — allows security and development teams to automate dynamic application security testing (DAST) as part of the CI/CD build pipeline workflow. For example, you can easily configure the integration to scan your team’s work for vulnerabilities, and if high-severity vulnerabilities are found, you can have it notify and/or block risky code before it reaches production environments.

Here’s how it works:

InsightAppSec GitHub Integration Keeps Risky Code From Reaching Production

All this happens automatically, so your team isn’t spending time finding and communicating application risk — they’re focusing on building a great application security program.

That’s not where the benefits end, however.

****1)********It helps integrate DevOps into the Security workflow:**** In order to help build a Dev SecOps mindset across teams, this integration allows DevOps and Security teams to work together earlier in the lifecycle, improving cross-team outcomes and making your organization safer.

****2)********Automate DAST as part of your CI/CD workflow:**** This integration fits in seamlessly with what you’re already doing, and automatically provides the vulnerability information your teams need to stay aware of risk and keep unsafe code out of your prod environments.

****3) Quick and easy setup:**** Simply add the IAS Scan steps to your build pipeline as defined in the insightappsec-scan-github-action repo (assuming you have valid Github and InsightAppSec licenses).

And it is all for free. We’re continuously working to make InsightAppSec the easiest and most powerful security platform for your web applications and teaming with Github will supercharge your development lifecycle in the safest way possible, automatically.

Ukraine-Russia Cyber Warzone Splits Cyber Underground

 

Description

The Russia-Ukraine cyber warzone has split the Conti ransomware gang into warring factions, leading to a Ukrainian member spilling 60,000 of the group’s internal chat messages online.

On Monday, vx-underground – an internet collection of malware source code, samples and papers that’s generally considered to be a benign entity – shared on Twitter a message from a Conti member saying that “This is a friendly heads-up that the Conti gang has just lost all their sh•t.”

The gang has also, apparently, lost a cache of chat data: the first dump of what the poster promised would be multiple, “very interesting” leaks coming from Conti’s Jabber/XMPP server.

“F•ck the Russian government, Glory to Ukraine!” the Conti member, who’s reportedly believed to be Ukrainian, proclaimed. Threatpost advises caution about clicking on any links provided in social media messages: They are, after all, provided by a ransomware group and should be treated with kid gloves.

Conti ransomware group previously put out a message siding with the Russian government.

Today a Conti member has begun leaking data with the message “Fuck the Russian government, Glory to Ukraine!”

You can download the leaked Conti data here: https://t.co/BDzHQU5mgw pic.twitter.com/AL7BXnihza

— vx-underground (@vxunderground) February 27, 2022

Cisco Talos’ Azim Khodjibaev said on Sunday verified that the dump does in fact contain conversations between affiliates, administrators and admins, rendered on Jabber instant-messaging accounts.

looks like the #conti leaks of 2022 are indeed chat logs from jabber accounts between affiliates, administrators and admins. Rejoice CTI analysts and data scientists, it is in json form! #busymonday pic.twitter.com/DiyqNoymsD

— Azim Khodjibaev (@AShukuhi) February 27, 2022

The conversations date back 13 months, from Jan. 29, 2021 to yesterday, Feb. 27 2022.

The first dump contains 339 JSON files, with each file representing a full day’s log. Cybersecurity firm IntelligenceX has posted the spilled conversations here. Many of the messages are written in a Cyrillic-scripted language that appears, at least according to Google translate, to be Russian.

The Perhaps-Less-Than-100% Russian Conti

Conti, a Russia-based extortionist gang, is considered to be as ruthless as it is sophisticated: It was the first professional-grade ransomware group to weaponize Log4j2.

On Friday, Conti sided with Russia, pledging “full support” for President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

“WARNING,” Conti blared on its blog, threatening to use its “full capacity” to retaliate in the face of “Western warmongers attempt to target critical infrastructure in Russia or any Russian-speaking region of the world.”

Conti blog pledge to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Source: Conti blog.

Cyberattacks Coming at and From Russia

The split-Conti story is just one of a myriad of cybersecurity headlines coming out of the siege of Ukraine. Some other events in the cyberwar that are rocking the security world:

Russia appears to deploy digital defenses after DDoS attacks

Anonymous Declares ‘Cyberwar’ on Russia and Pledges Support for Ukraine

Anonymous breached the internal network of Belarusian railways

Ukraine: Volunteer IT Army is going to hit tens of Russian targets from this list

Richard Fleeman, vice president of penetration testing ops at cybersecurity advisory services provider Coalfire, told Threatpost on Monday that collective groups such as Anonymous claim to be hacktivists, meaning they don’t attack for personal gain, but rather that they seek to spread their ideology and wage cyberwarfare against those that don’t align.

“These kinds of activities ebb and flow based on geopolitical events or collective objectives of these groups,” he said. This isn’t new, but they’ll likely escalate “amidst the global chaos to target various countries, government agencies, and corporations.”

“These groups thrive on sentiment and will likely continue to build momentum based on their objectives,” Fleeman observed.

The muddle of war can also obscure false flag or false information campaigns that target, influence or mislead others, he said. “This can be accomplished in a variety of ways, for example, China compromising Russian technology and targeting other nations through the compromised infrastructure to hide the origins of their attacks or embedding Russian language or terms into source code of malware would aid in the hiding [of] the true origin.”

He urged that situational awareness be elevated and that security teams “be vigilant, remain alert, and leverage their security mechanisms in place to identify threats and mitigate them in a fluid manner.”

The Lure of War to Cyber Actors

Casey Ellis, founder and CTO at crowdsourced cybersecurity provider Bugcrowd, told Threatpost on Monday that the bloodless nature of cyber combat makes it tough to predict who’ll enter this conflict and how.

“The fact that a lot of unrelated but concerned actors have entered the conflict is unsurprising,” he noted via email. “Anonymous, for example, is well-known for having a principled position on topics and then acting or retaliating via the Internet.”

His primary concern: “the relative difficulty of attribution in cyberattacks, as well as the possibility of incorrect attribution or even an intentional false flag operation escalating the conflict internationally.”

Russia will likely avoid provoking the United States “until it’s tactically or strategically advantageous for them to do so, which we all hope we can avoid,” he noted. Last week, the White House denied considering plans to launch massive cyberattacks against Russia in order to cut off its ability to pursue its military aggression – denials made in spite of NBC News quoting multiple sources to the contrary.

“Having said that, the backdrop of conflict and the openness of the Internet provide greater than normal levels of’”aircover’ and background noise for cybercriminals, as well as other nation-states looking to plant a false flag,” Ellis said.

John Bambenek, principal threat hunter at digital IT and security operations company Netenrich, told Threatpost via email that it’s the wild west out there: Traditional actors are using sabotage and DDoS related to military objectives, he observed, while others “will use the fog of war (quite literally) to take advantage. No one has to commit front line infantry if they want to take advantage anymore,” he said.

Expect a pig pile, he predicted: “Usually for conflicts in that region, other non-state regional actors will engage, either due to patriotism or opportunism. Now that more nations are developing this capability, more are coming to play. And there is no better training ground for nation-state actors than playing in an active warzone.”

What does that mean for security teams in the United States and other western countries? It depends on what the West does, he said. “If we get involved militarily, then the scope of attacks will increase to those nations as well. If it is targeted sanctions, likely attacks will focus on those in the chain of enforcement.”

Iranian Hackers Targeting VMware Horizon Log4j Flaws to Deploy Ransomware

 

Description

VMware Horizon Log4j

A “potentially destructive actor” aligned with the government of Iran is actively exploiting the well-known Log4j vulnerability to infect unpatched VMware Horizon servers with ransomware.

Cybersecurity firm SentinelOne dubbed the group "TunnelVision" owing to their heavy reliance on tunneling tools, with overlaps in tactics observed to that of a broader group tracked under the moniker Phosphorus as well as Charming Kitten and Nemesis Kitten.

“TunnelVision activities are characterized by wide-exploitation of 1-day vulnerabilities in target regions,” SentinelOne researchers Amitai Ben Shushan Ehrlich and Yair Rigevsky said in a report, with the intrusions detected in the Middle East and the U.S.

Also observed alongside Log4Shell is the exploitation of Fortinet FortiOS path traversal flaw (CVE-2018-13379) and the Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerability to gain initial access into the target networks for post-exploitation.

“TunnelVision attackers have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to run malicious PowerShell commands, deploy backdoors, create backdoor users, harvest credentials and perform lateral movement,” the researchers said.

The PowerShell commands are used as a launchpad to download tools like Ngrok and run further commands by means of reverse shells that are employed to drop a PowerShell backdoor that’s capable of gathering credentials and executing reconnaissance commands.

SentinelOne also said it identified similarities in the mechanism used to execute the reverse web shell with another PowerShell-based implant called PowerLess that was disclosed by Cybereason researchers earlier this month.

All through the activity, the threat actor is said to have utilized a GitHub repository known as “VmWareHorizon” under the username “protections20” to host the malicious payloads.

The cybersecurity company said it’s associating the attacks to a separate Iranian cluster not because they are unrelated, but owing to the fact that “there is at present insufficient data to treat them as identical to any of the aforementioned attributions.”

Log4Shell 2 Months Later: Security Strategies for the Internet's New Normal

 

Description

Log4Shell 2 Months Later: Security Strategies for the Internet's New Normal

CVE-2021-44228 rules everything around us — or so it seemed, at least, for those breathless days in December 2021 when the full scope of Log4Shell was starting to take hold and security teams were strapped for time and resources as they scoured their organizations’ environments for vulnerable instances of Apache Log4j. But now that the peak intensity around this vulnerability has waned and we’ve had a chance to catch our collective breath, where does the effort to patch and remediate stand? What should security teams be focusing on today in the fight against Log4Shell?

On Wednesday, February 16, Rapid7 experts Bob Rudis, Devin Krugly, and Glenn Thorpe sat down for a webinar on the current state of the Log4j vulnerability. They covered where Log4Shell stands now, what the future might hold, and what organizations should be doing proactively to ensure they’re as protected as possible against exploits.

Laying out the landscape

Glenn Thorpe, Rapid7’s Program Manager for Emergent Threat Response, kicked things off with a recap and retrospective of Log4Shell and why it seemingly set fire to the entire internet for a good portion of December. The seriousness of this vulnerability is due to the coming-together of several key factors, including:

  • The ability for vulnerable systems to grant an attacker full administrative access
  • The low level of skill required for exploitation — in many cases, attackers simply have to copy and paste
  • The attack vector’s capability to run undetected over an encrypted channel
  • The pervasiveness of the Log4j library, which means vulnerability scanners alone can’t act as complete solutions against this threat

Put all this together, and it’s no surprise that the volume of exploit attempts leveraging the Log4j vulnerability ramped up throughout December 2021 and has continued to spike periodically throughout January and February 2022. By January 10, ransomware using Log4Shell had been observed, and on January 14, Rapid7’s MDR saw mass Log4j exploits in VMware products.

But while there’s certainly been plenty of Log4j patching done, the picture on that front is far from complete. According to the latest CISA data (also here as a daily-updated spreadsheet), there are still 320 cataloged software products that are known to be affected by vulnerable Log4j as of February 16, 2022 — and 1,406 still awaiting confirmation from the vendor.

Log4Shell 2 Months Later: Security Strategies for the Internet's New Normal

Log4j today: A new normal?

So, where does the effort to put out Log4j fires stand now? Devin Krugly, Rapid7’s Practice Advisor for Vulnerability Risk Management, thinks we’re in a better spot than we were in December — but we’re by no means out of the woods.

“We’re effectively out of fire-fighting mode,” said Devin. That means that, at this point, most security teams have identified the affected systems, implemented mitigations, and patched vulnerable versions of Log4j. But because of the complexity of today’s software supply chains, there are often heavily nested dependencies within vendor systems — some of which Log4j may still be implicated in. This means it’s essential to have a solid inventory of vendor software products that may be using Log4j and to ensure those instances of the library are updated and patched.

“Don’t lose that momentum,” Glenn chimed in. “Don’t put that on your post-mortem action list and forget about it.”

This imperative is all the more critical because of a recent uptick in Log4Shell activity. Rapid7’s Chief Data Scientist Bob Rudis laid out some activity detected by the Project Heisenberg honeypot fleet indicating a revival of Log4j activity in early and mid-February, much of it from new infrastructure and scanning hosts that hadn’t been seen before.

Amid this increase in activity, vulnerable instances of Log4j are anything but gone from the internet. In fact, data from Sonatype as of February 16, 2022 indicates 39% of Log4j downloads are _still _versions vulnerable to Log4Shell.

“We’re going to be seeing Log4j attempts on the internet, on the regular, at a low level, forever," Bob said. Log4Shell is now in a family with WannaCry and Conficker (yes, that Conficker) — vulnerabilities that are around indefinitely, and which we’ll need to continually monitor for as attackers use them to try to breach our defenses.

Navigating life with Log4Shell

Adopting a defense-in-depth posture in the “new normal” of life with Log4Shell is sure to come with its share of headaches. Luckily, Bob, Devin, and Glenn shared some practical strategies that security teams can adopt to keep their organizations’ defenses strong and avoid some common pitfalls.

Go beyond compensating controls

“My vendor says they’ve removed the JNDI class from the JAR file — does that mean their application is no longer vulnerable to Log4Shell?” This question came up in a few different forms from our webinar audience. The answer from our panelists was nuanced but crystal-clear: maybe for now, but not forever.

Removing the JNDI class is a compensating control — one that provides a quick fix for the vulnerability but doesn’t patch the core, underlying problem via a full update. For example, when you do a backup, you might unknowingly reintroduce the JNDI class after removing it — or, as Devin pointed out, an attacker could chain together a replacement for it.

These kinds of compensating or mitigating controls have their place in a short-term response, but there’s simply no action that can replace the work of upgrading all instances of Log4j to the most up-to-date versions that contain patches for Log4Shell.

“Mitigate for speed, but not in perpetuity,” Glenn recommended.

Find the nooks and crannies

Today’s cloud-centric IT environments are increasingly ephemeral and on-demand — a boost for innovation and speed, but that also means teams can deploy workloads without security teams ever knowing about it. Adopting an “Always Be Scanning” mindset, as Bob put it, is essential to ensure vulnerable instances of Log4j aren’t introduced into your environment.

Continually scanning your internet-facing components is a good and necessary start — but the work doesn’t end there. As Devin pointed out, finding the nooks and crannies where Log4j might crop up is critical. This includes scouring containers and virtual machines, as well as analyzing application and server logs for malicious JNDI strings. You should also ensure your security operations center (SOC) team can quickly and easily identify indicators that your environment is being scanned for reconnaissance into Log4Shell exploit opportunities.

“Involving the SOC team for alerting purposes, if you haven’t already done that, is an absolutely necessity in this case," said Devin.

Get better at vendor management

It should be clear by now that in a post-Log4j world, organizations must demand the highest possible level of visibility into their software supply chain — and that means being clear, even tough, with vendors.

“Managing stuff on the internet is hard because organizations are chaotic beings by nature, and you’re trying to control the chaos as a security professional," said Bob. Setting yourself up success in this context means having the highest level of vulnerability possible. After all, how many other vulnerabilities just as bad as Log4Shell — or even worse — might be out there lurking in the corners of your vendors’ code?

The upcoming US government requirements around Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for vendor procurement should go a long way toward raising expectations for software vendors. Start asking vendors if they can produce an SBOM that details remediation and update of any vulnerable instances of Log4j.

These conversations don’t need to be adversarial — in fact, vendors can be a key resource in the effort to defend against Log4Shell. Especially for smaller organizations or under-resourced security teams, relying on capable third parties can be a smart way to bolster your defenses.

Only you can secure the software supply chain

OK, maybe that subhead is not literally true — a secure software supply chain is a community-wide effort, to which we must all hold each other accountable. The cloud-based digital ecosystem we all inhabit, whether we like it or not, is fundamentally interconnected. A pervasive vulnerability like Log4Shell is an unmistakable reminder of that fact.

It also serves as an opportunity to raise our expectations of ourselves, our organizations, and our partners — and those choices do start at home, with each security team as they update their applications, continually scan their environments, and demand visibility from their vendors. Those actions really do help create a more secure internet for everyone.

So while we’ll be living with Log4Shell probably forever, it’ll be living with us, too. And as scared as you are of the spider, it’s even more scared of your boot.

Want to go more in-depth? Check out the full replay of our webinar, "Log4Shell Two Months Later: Lessons and Insights for Protectors."

Quick resources:

Bob, Devin, and Glenn mentioned a wealth of handy links in their discussion. Here are those resources for quick, easy reference.

Additional reading:

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